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Introduction 
Since the establishment of a European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and a fully 
fledged EU regional policy there has been a considerable scholarly interest in the link 
between processes of integration at the European level and of regionalisation within member 
states. Academic debates on the mobilisation of sub-national elites and their participation in 
what was termed a system for multi-level governance gradually extended in the context of EU 
enlargement to Bulgaria and other applicant states. In particular, connection was sought 
between national decisions on regionalisation and regional policies (jointly sub-national 
governance) and requirements to approximate with EU regulations and practices in view of 
membership. The concept of conditionality was used to explain how the EU linked carrots and 
sticks to exercise active leverage on the timing and substance of reforms in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (Grabbe 2001). The concept of EU conditionality drew 
on the demandeur position of Bulgaria and other applicants which allowed the EU to dictate 
the terms of entry (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). The Copenhagen criteria for accession 
(stability of institutions and the rule of law, existence of market economy and ability to apply 
the acquis upon membership) were considered a prime example of the EU’s active leverage. 
While in the short term their fulfilment was costly, the longer Bulgaria waited the more 
demanding EU membership was likely to become since the process of EU integration 
continues to deepen. The EU’s active leverage was stronger with regard to applicants 
threatened by exclusion from membership and, by extension, with regard to second wave 
candidates (Brusis 2005: 293). The Bulgarian government faced toughening EU conditions 
and external scrutiny but also significant public pressure to accomplish the long-awaited 
‘return to Europe’ (Nikolova 2006b). The prospect of economic benefits from membership 
and the possibility to sit on the EU decision-making table also provided reform incentives.   2
Consequently, Bulgaria was more eager than the first-wavers to make itself ‘appealing’ for 
the EU in areas where formal criteria were not specified (Nikolova 2006). This suggested that 
the EU had a passive leverage or ‘traction’ on candidate states ‘merely by virtue of its 
existence and its usual conduct’ (Vachudova 2005: 65).  
 
The link between the EU’s passive and active leverage and their impact on domestic reforms 
are captured by the concept of Europeanisation. Originally developed for member states, it 
differentiates between areas in which the EU has substantial acquis and others in which its 
achievements are at best thin. In the first case the EU exercises pressure on Bulgaria to adapt, 
in the second it remoulds domestic opportunity structures and provides national actors with a 
justification for domestic reforms or for specific policy options. There is no EU acquis with 
regard to institution-building at the sub-national level and there are only minimalist principles 
in regional policy and structural funds implementation. Using the example of Bulgaria this 
article argues that in such cases of ‘ambiguous’ conditionality (Hughes et al 2004) changes in 
sub-national governance can be initiated by domestic actors who following a ‘logic of 
consequentialism’ use the EU strategically in national politics or get infected by ‘appropriate’ 
EU ideas and transfer them into national policies (March and Olsen 1989, Richardson 2000: 
1017-20). These processes of ‘intended’ and ‘responsive’ Europeanisation (Ioakimidis 2001: 
74-5) can, and often do take place simultaneously. Furthermore, in a context of uncertain 
performance benchmarks and uneven acquis the Commission’s preferences (or domestic 
actors’ perceptions of such preferences) matter for the course of reforms. Although 
entrepreneurial, the Commission itself is hardly a unified and consistent actor. 
 
This article assesses the reforms in sub-national governance in Bulgaria in the years of post-
communist transition and pre-accession (1991-2005) in order to make conclusions about 
Europeanisation and domestic responses in candidate states. It draws on a number of 
Bulgarian policy documents and Commission reports and on forty semi-structured interviews 
with officials of the European Commission, Bulgarian national ministries and sub-national 
authorities in the period April-August 2004. The article proceeds by briefly outlining the 
theoretical framework. Europeanisation is a concept originally developed for member states 
and it is therefore necessary to take into account the specifics of the enlargement process at 
the theoretical level in order to be able to apply it to Bulgaria. In the second part of this article 
it is argued that the models provided by the EU in the area of sub-national governance are 
fuzzy, the Commission preferences were incoherent across DGs and over time, and the tools   3
for exercising EU pressure (the mechanisms for Europeanisation) leaked out EU influence 
and allowed models and pressures from elsewhere to filter in. The third part of this paper 
examines the reforms in the administrative-territorial organisation of Bulgaria while the fourth 
section focuses on the creation and content of the national policy for addressing territorial 
disparities (regional policy). The concluding part reflects upon the utility of the concept of 
Europeanisation to explain processes of change beyond the EU territorial boundaries and 
about the challenges of future Europeanisation research on recent entrants as Bulgaria. 
 
 
1. Europeanisation East 
As an academic concept Europeanisation is contested. The large number of definitions 
featuring in studies of member countries (Dyson 2000, Green Cowles et al. 2001, 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Héritier et al 2001) and candidate and non-member states 
(Featherstone and Kazamias 2001; Grabbe 2003; Kux and Sverdrup 2000; Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005) is evidence of a vibrant debate in an emerging academic field. But 
extensive empirical application presents the danger of ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970). 
This article endorses Radaelli’s (2003: 30) definition of Europeanisation as a dynamic 
process, with the qualification made by Grabbe (2003) that Europeanisation in the context of 
eastward enlargement (Europeanisation East) is about the diffusion and institutionalisation at 
home of EU formal rules, policy principles, shared beliefs and norms. A process of 
construction of a regional policy and of understandings of good and participatory governance 
is also underway at the EU level, since widening has gone hand in hand with deepening in the 
EU history (Nugent 1992). However, leaving the process of construction out of 
Europeanisation East helps highlight that applicants for membership ‘are not yet acting within 
the EU policy cycle’ but rather ‘interact with the EU system at different levels and with 
different degrees of intensity’ (Lippert et al 2001: 984). It can be argued that prospective 
members influenced rules and policies adopted at the EU level through participation in the 
joint pre-accession institutions, or by means of their observer status in EU bodies and in the 
European Convention. Votes taken by incumbent member states on the reform of spending 
policies such as structural funds may have also incorporate considerations of forthcoming 
accessions of poorer neighbours (Miles et al. 1995: 181, Begg 1998; Marshal 2004). But there 
is still little systematic research to support claims that early interactions of applicants with the 
EU system amount to actual influence over it. Europeanisation East is therefore presumed to 
be a top-down process in the sense that Bulgaria can only download EU models and policy   4
ideas but cannot upload its national preferences and practices into the EU’s ‘regulatory 
patchwork’ and reduce the costs of adaptation (Heritier 1996). Instead, Bulgaria has to rely on 
the EU to shoulder part of the burden by means of pre-accession assistance and later structural 
funding. 
 
With regard to the possible outcomes of Europeanisation, Radaelli (2003) identifies four types 
of responses: retrenchment of existing structures and practices, lack of change (inertia), 
absorption within the existing domestic repertoires, and transformation. Europeanisation East 
could not result in retrenchment or inertia because overt non-compliance with EU 
requirements would be equivalent to non-membership. This argument presumes asymmetry of 
power between the EU and Bulgaria, high domestic salience of accession and credibility of 
the EU’s threat of exclusion or postponement of membership (Grabbe 2001). When EU 
requirements coincide with domestic arrangements, they will simply be absorbed into the 
existing Bulgarian repertoires. But should the coupling of EU conditionality and passive 
leverage suggest that in the alternative case of lack of ‘fit’ (Borzel 2001) between EU 
requirements and Bulgarian arrangements Europeanisation East would always result in 
substantial change? Lang (2003: 160) makes a useful distinction between short-term domestic 
responses to EU influence and long-term changes as a result of Europeanisation. He 
differentiates between substantial and isolated change. In the short term substantial change is 
only possible when reforms of domestic structures and policies are underpinned by already 
existing favourable national traditions and practices. Underlying informal traditions, practices 
and understandings of appropriate behaviour change much slower than formal rules and 
structures. It is possible in the short term EU influence to result only in isolated change 
whereby formal structures demonstrate compliance but the key processes and outputs remain 
unaffected. In the long run these parallel systems can consolidate, or a transformation of 
underlying patterns can result in the merger of the two parallel systems and therefore to 
substantial change.  
 
The mechanisms through which Europeanisation can occur are vertical and horizontal 
(framing) (Radaelli 2003). Vertical mechanisms rely on thick EU acquis to define the 
direction of domestic change and ensure compliance of applicant countries. There are other, 
‘soft’ mechanisms of Europeanisation that only provide a frame for domestic reforms when 
the EU acquis is thin (general guidelines or minimalist regulations). National actors may use 
EU policy developments strategically to ‘frame’ domestic reforms, redefine domestic   5
problems and expectations or ‘inseminate’ new solutions to old debates (Dyson, 2000). When 
actors make choices, they may follow a situation-specific ‘logic of appropriateness’, rather 
than one of rational calculus. Decisions taken appropriately are legitimate in the eye of 
observers but not necessarily optimal. Norms of appropriateness and rationality may well be 
culturally-determined myths enacted ceremonially (Meyer and Rowan 1991), ‘window 
dressing’ used by powerful manipulators in the struggle over political outcomes (March and 
Olsen 1989: 51-2). Europeanisation is also possible when no explicit EU guidelines exist and 
the EU is used as a platform for policy transfer (Bache, 2000; Bomberg and Peterson, 2000). 
Finally, Europeanisation can disseminate in domestic politics modes of governance that 
render the balance of power between actors and levels irrelevant. The network mode of 
governance may influence perceptions of legitimate governance altogether and have powerful 
long-term effects on domestic politics per se (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). 
 
A final point should be made with regard to the role of the Commission in Europeanisation 
East. Héritier (2005) has argued that its preferences are bound to matter more to candidate 
than to member states. There was a widespread recognition that although member states took 
the major political decisions, it was the Commission that kept the enlargement process on 
track when the Council was preoccupied with more pressing matters. The Commission acted 
as an important gatekeeper at each step of the enlargement process. It could spell out concrete 
reform steps even where the EU acquis was thin. Applicant states were likely to follow since 
the Commission was the one to keep the enlargement door open. The Commission can also 
represent a strategic asset in domestic politics. Mitchell Smith (1997: 172) has argued that 
invoking the Commission quickly alters the terms of the national debate. If an actor could 
unequivocally establish that the recommendations or the evaluation reports by the 
Commission precluded particular policy options, ‘the policy preferences of actors favouring 
these outcomes will necessarily shift’. This was because the Commission appeared to be 
‘objective’ and fair; it had thorough knowledge of the developments in Bulgaria, and an 
‘inside-out’ understanding of the EU acquis. But the Commission has its own policy 
preferences and an interest in developing its executive powers in areas where the EU acquis is 
thin (Smyrl 1998). 
 
It is therefore important first to establish the type and density of the EU acquis in relation to 
sub-national governance and the possible mechanisms at work in the process of 
Europeanisation East. The thinness/thickness of the acquis and the reliability of the   6
mechanisms will circumscribe the possible outcomes of Europeanisation as will domestic 
formal and informal institutions. 
 
 
2. EU models and mechanisms 
The question of whether the EU can offer to Bulgaria a model of sub-national governance 
should consider two complementary perspectives: first, is there a unified model of 
administrative-territorial organisation at the intermediate level (regionalisation) across the 
EU, and second, are there principles common to member states in the implementation of 
regional actions and policies under the EU structural funds. With regard to the first question, 
Bullmann (1997) has argued that regionalisation processes in the EU have taken an extremely 
asymmetrical course and that the majority of EU member states are still unitary in character. 
Jones and Keating (1994) have also observed very diverse patterns of institution-building at 
the intermediate (regional) level, sometimes involving the establishment of regional 
governments while in other cases simply providing a regulated framework for interaction 
among institutions already operating on a particular territory. Indeed, as Keating has noted 
(2003: 11), different notions of ‘space’ have informed national policies of regionalisation 
(territorial, political, social, economic, functional space). Nation-states were forced into 
ceding power either by constant cultural, ethnic and social demands from below or as part of a 
global drive for modernization of the national political systems in industrialized states 
(Bullmann 1997: 9-10).  
 
The process of European integration contributed to the emergence of a ‘new regionalism’ 
(Keating 1998) because it confronted member states with widening territorial disparities but 
also provided a supranational solution in the guise of an ERDF and later a fully fledged EU 
regional policy. The Commission promoted partnership with sub-national actors as one of the 
principles of ERDF implementation, together with additionality of Community and national 
funding, concentration of aid on most needy regions and programming of regional 
development measures (Allen 2000). Partnership suggested that responsibility for targeting 
and implementing regional funding is shared among the Commission, the national 
governments and the sub-national actors and that there should be complementarity and co-
operation in their actions. For Hooghe (1996a: 89) partnership was not only a policy principle 
but also ‘a set of organisational structures for collaboration’ among different levels of 
government built in the process of formulation and implementation of EU regional policy. As   7
a consequence of the partnership principle direct links were created between the Commission 
and sub-national actors, many of which opened offices in Brussels and got involved in trans-
national coalitions and networks (Mazey and Richardson 1993).  
 
Some authors depicted the EU as a multi-level system of governance in which member states’ 
central executives, although powerful, are only one set of actors among others; supranational, 
national and sub-national levels of decision-making have overlapping competences (Marks, 
1996, Marks and Hooghe 1997). Regional authorities have the potential to circumvent the 
traditional channels of representation and to influence EU policies on structural funding 
(Mény 2001). This sometimes has led to the slogan ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Rhodes 1974) 
and was expected to spur in Central and Eastern Europe a struggle from below for 
regionalisation. Yet Le Gales and Lequesne concluded that in practice regions of member 
states ‘seem to be rather minor political actors in European governance’ (1998: 8; see also 
Rhodes et al 1996: 372). National governments established themselves as important 
gatekeepers in regional policy and contested the principles of implementing structural 
funding; since 1993 the designation of partners has been fully subjected to national 
institutional arrangements (Bache 1998). Bullmann (1997: 17-8) has argued that where an 
intermediate tier exists or has been created, the actual impact of the sub-national authorities 
on EU governance has depended on the economic, political and institutional capacities of the 
regional structures, and on the social and cultural demands that they articulated (for a similar 
conclusion see Bailey and De Propis 2002). To put it differently, mainly economically 
affluent and ethnically determined sub-national entities created a bottom-up push for more 
political influence domestically and at the EU level. But what can be the stimuli for an 
economic laggard like Bulgaria with no history of regionalisation? Can ‘peripheral regional 
elites’ create a bottom-up push and will the EU provide a pull for sub-national governance 
(Syssner 2006)? Or could the impetus stem exclusively from a post-communist concern for 
increased administrative efficiency and improvement of service provision at the closest to the 
citizens level? Before considering the specific domestic constellation of actors and the 
distribution of power in the relevant constitutional framework (sections 3 and 4), let us first 
examine by what means the EU influences regionalisation and regional policy in Bulgaria.  
 
Grabbe (2001) has pointed out the gatekeeping power of the EU at different stages of the 
accession process, most notably in the frame of accession negotiations. The EU also provided 
pre-accession assistance, advice and expertise through Twinning but this was conditional   8
upon the fulfilment of certain reform objectives and the creation of the necessary structures, 
procedures and programming documents for their management. The European Commission is 
assumed to have played a substantial role in operationalising the Europeanisation mechanisms 
because it was in charge of drafting the Opinion on Bulgaria’s application for membership 
and the subsequent annual Reports on progress towards accession that identified national 
weaknesses and outlined reform goals. These were complemented by regularly updated 
Accession Partnerships containing short- to mid-term objectives to be met by the national 
government in all acquis areas. After the Accession Treaty was signed by Bulgaria the 
Commission drafted two Monitoring Reports that could trigger a super-safeguard clause and 
delay the country’s membership by a year. The Reports by the Commission and the Accession 
Partnerships represented an important benchmarking and monitoring exercise through which 
EU influence was channelled.  
 
Chapter 21 Regional Policy and Structural Instruments was, as Friis (2003) put it, among the 
‘super heavyweight’ chapters of the accession negotiations because of its significant 
implications for the EU budget and the economic development of Bulgaria. Among the last 
negotiating chapters to be opened in late November 2001, it was only closed as part of the end 
game in June 2004 together with the contentious chapters on financial control, financial and 
budgetary provisions, agriculture and competition. Bulgaria did not request any transition 
periods since this could cause phasing-in of financial transfers. The opening and closure of 
Chapter 21 were an important milestone on Bulgaria’s road to membership and a clear 
indication of the future membership benefits. While chapters such as Competition required 
significant effort by Bulgaria with regard to legislative approximation, Chapter 21 was quite 
scarce on concrete EU requirements. In its Guide to the accession negotiations, the 
Commission (2003) pointed out the need for Bulgaria to establish the ‘appropriate’ legal 
framework for structural funds implementation, as well as the requirement to develop the 
national programming and administrative capacity for structural intervention and to 
strengthen provisions for financial and budgetary management. Bulgaria was also expected to 
ensure the implementation of the partnership principle and to define clearly the tasks of all 
bodies and institutions involved in the preparation and implementation of structural and 
cohesion projects. The lack of any specific guidance on how these outcomes to be achieved 
should not be mistaken for an EU indifference about how money is spent (this was addressed 
in Chapter 28 Financial Control) but compared to member states’ freedom to choose the best 
domestic arrangements for achieving the required EU objectives (the so called ‘obligation of   9
results’). A Commission official thus remarked that the structural funds did not expect 
Bulgaria to establish a regional level of self-government. Yet from a practical point of view it 
could add value to the national policies for regional development by promoting ownership of 
projects and help with targeting measures.  
 
The thinness of the EU acquis in regional policy opened a window of opportunity for the 
Commission to promote to Bulgaria principles of EU regional policy contested by member 
states (most notably partnership) and to encourage the introduction in CEECs of a 
regionalised territorial organisation. The main leverage of the Commission was the NUTS 
classification; the need to fit structures into the Commission’s categories affected the ‘choices 
on size and boundaries’ of sub-national entities and in that sense ‘the Commission was 
imposing a model’ on CEECs (Dehaene and Krok-Paszkowska 2001: 113, 121) . The Guide 
to accession negotiations specified that Bulgaria needed to agree with the Commission a 
provisional NUTS classification for the implementation of the Structural Funds. The NUTS II 
level served statistical purposes as the most appropriate level for analysis of socio-economic 
disparities in view of distributing structural funding. Structural funds projects were drafted 
and funded at this level. It could be expected that the prospect of significant EU transfers at 
NUTS II level would encourage Bulgaria to re-organise its administrative-territorial division 
by introducing a corresponding regional tier of government. Hughes et al (2003: 75-7) have 
documented the perception of actors from CEE states that the Commission expected this 
process of administrative regionalisation to be accompanied by a transfer of political powers.  
 
However, Kohler-Koch (2002: 3-4) identified a tendency to overestimate the capacity of the 
EU carrots and sticks and the role of the Commission in shaping sub-national governance. 
Furthermore, for Grabbe (2001) the Commission itself was unsure how far it could go in 
recommending models in sensitive areas such as sub-national organisation where member 
states have exclusive competences. Dehaene and Krok-Paszkowska (2001: 113) concluded 
that the ‘Commission should encourage decentralization, or at least deconcentration, but it 
should be weary of imposing structures’ considering the small size of many CEECs, the 
specific domestic political context and historical traditions. Contents of Regular Reports 
suggest that there was indeed an outright Commission insistence on the creation of 
comprehensive regional policy in Bulgaria but no explicitly stated requirement for regional 
self-government. Recommendations for action under Chapter 21 concerned mainly capacity 
building in the central administration. Similarly, the goals set in the Accession Partnerships   10
addressed programming and implementation weaknesses in the national ministries. In its 
Action Plan on Judicial and Administrative Capacity the Commission recommended the 
building of ‘appropriate structures at central, regional and local level’ but without formally 
specifying what was ‘appropriate’ (Commission 2002: 12). A noteworthy exception was the 
Commission’s critique of the vague definition of competences at the NUTS 2 level and of 
other bodies involved in the preparations for structural funding (Commission 2000: 70, 2001: 
74, Commission 2003: 19). Attention was also drawn to the need for further clarification of 
powers between the political (NUTS III) and administrative (NUTS II) levels in order to 
ensure smooth implementation (Commission 1999: 47). But in contrast to the ambiguous 
conditionality on regionalisation, the Regular Reports did focus on the application of the 
partnership principle when formulating policies for regional development. The 2001 Regular 
Report insisted ‘genuine partnership structures’ to be created at the NUTS II level including 
regional and local authorities and economic and social actors ‘in line with the partnership 
principle’ (Commission 2001: 74-5). The 2002 and 2003 Reports recommended further steps 
to be taken to ‘enhance the application of the partnership principle’ without specifying 
requirements for regionalisation (Commission 2002: 101).  
 
Previous research on the Commission has emphasised its nature of a ‘multi-organisation’ 
where Directorates General (DG) have varied policy remits and administrative cultures, and 
where officials are faced with a menu of sometimes incompatible motivations and options 
(Cini, 1996; Cram, 1994, Hooghe 1997, McDonald 1997). In the context of EU enlargement 
and regional policy Hughes et al (2004) have argued that the partnership preferences of the 
European Commission shifted over time due to practical ‘value for money concerns’ and 
divergent views of DGs on the involvement of sub-national actors. Following the Santer 
debacle the Commission became extremely preoccupied with financial management and 
control. Since administrative capacity at the sub-national level was very weak, the 
Commission encouraged centralisation of pre-accession aid management. Its efforts focused 
on institution and capacity building in the central administration where tougher control on 
spending could be exercised. Thus until as late as 2003 Bulgarian district authorities were cut 
off from Phare economic and social cohesion funding. Furthermore, the speed and intensity of 
the enlargement process itself gave the central government a monopoly over the relations with 
the EU. A Commission official recognised that during accession preparations they did not 
have the time to ‘go down’ to the sub-national actors; it was left to the Bulgarian central 
government to find the best way to include them in the preparations for accession. This was a   11
significant setback in terms of knowledge and expertise accumulation at the sub-national level 
and hindered bottom-up mobilisation in favour of regionalisation or representation at the EU 
level. There was also disagreement within the Commission as to whether sub-national actors 
had to be involved. An official from DG enlargement claimed that the implementation of the 
pre-accession funds was the responsibility of the national governments, while an official from 
DG Regional Policy argued that partnership was the key principle. Yet all Commission 
officials underlined that they never required Bulgaria to establish regional self-government 
and that if there was pressure it had come not from the Commission but from the Committee 
of the Regions or from regions in member states. 
 
The Phare-funded Twinning projects placed national civil servants from member states in the 
Bulgarian public administration and thus provided a channel for socialisation and transfer of 
models from member states. Contrary to its policy leadership in the setting up of the 
Twinning instrument, the Commission’s involvement in the implementation of Twinning 
projects was low key. It endorsed the projects, monitored their implementation and assessed 
whether they helped address the weaknesses identified in the Regular Reports and the 
Accession Partnerships. However, it was Bulgaria that chose the partner member state 
regardless of costs and the two had the main responsibility for the project implementation. It 
is undeniable that Twinning was an appropriate capacity building tool in the sense that it took 
into account the wide variety of administrative traditions and sub-national structures in 
member and applicant states. But it is much less clear to what extent it constituted a 
mechanism for channelling EU influence since it opened Bulgaria to influences from 
individual member states and in some cases private consultancy bodies. It may be claimed 
that as a framing mechanism it offered an opportunity for socialisation into the partnership 
rhetoric but as a vertical mechanism it could hardly contribute to the transfer of an EU model 
where it existed. 
 
The Twinning instrument formed part of the Phare pre-accession programme which, together 
with Ispa and Sapard, provided money to Bulgaria to address weaknesses identified in the 
Regular Reports and the Accession Partnership. The Ispa programme funded transport and 
environment infrastructure projects while Sapard helped with the implementation of the 
agricultural and rural development acquis. The two programmes were managed by the central 
government but sub-national authorities could be beneficiaries of projects. Their 
implementation rules were designed by the Commission to provide Bulgaria with a learning-  12
by-doing exercise on managing money from the Cohesion and agricultural funds respectively. 
Phare was revised in 1997 and again in 2000 to support institution- and capacity-building at 
the central and sub-national levels through transfer of know-how and physical investment in 
key regulatory institutions. The 2000 Phare review identified the additional challenge of 
orienting Phare national structures and procedures into a form suitable for absorbing structural 
funds upon membership. It also funded Cross-Border Co-operation projects between regions. 
While Phare did not have a unique and direct successor after accession, its Economic and 
Social Cohesion strand was intended to pilot-test the types of activities financed by the ERDF 
and the European Social Fund for member states. It aimed to support small projects managed 
by sub-national partners and thus help them with capacity-building. An additional task of the 
pre-accession funds was to enhance accountability in the corruption-ridden post-communist 
administrations of CEECs. The transfer of money through Phare, Ispa and Sapard was made 
conditional on the setting up of the appropriate management structures, programming 
documents and rules for financial control and monitoring (Nikolova 2007). In 2000 no CEE 
state received Sapard money; this provided a good example that the Commission would not 
release earmarked funds if structures were not in place or institutional capacity was lacking. 
The Commission responsibilities in the area of management of EU aid to CEE were ‘unique’ 
even by national standards (Christiansen 2001: 103). Bulgaria was expected to adapt its 
policies and institutions to fit into the Commission requirements. In this way the ‘incentive 
structure’ was altered and institutions were set up to gain available funding (Dehaene and 
Krok-Paszkowska 2001: 122).  
 
 
3. Administrative-territorial reforms in Bulgaria 
Bulgaria has traditionally been a highly centralised state. In 1964 there were 28 intermediate 
entities (okrug) and a large number of municipalities. In 1987 the okrug were replaced by nine 
districts. Regulations on self-government of territorial communities were improved and 
municipalities and their executive bodies - mayoralties - became the main units of territorial 
management. Districts were given limited functions only, including control and coordination. 
The post-communist Constitution of 1991 established Bulgaria as a unitary state with local 
self-government and no autonomous territorial formations. Priority was given to the 
municipal decentralisation although the approach of designating municipalities was top-down. 
As early as 1991 a Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act was adopted 
establishing directly elected Municipal Councils (local parliaments) and mayors (executives).   13
This was perceived as an important stage of the post-communist transformation, a tool for 
improved administrative efficiency and by implication government legitimation (Djildjov 
2002). Until 1998 Bulgaria’s administrative –territorial division was complemented by the 
aforementioned nine intermediate administrative units. It was only in 1999 that 
administrative-territorial reforms were undertaken at the intermediate level with the 
reinstatement of the 28 administrative units from 1964, now to be called districts, and the 
creation of six planning regions at NUTS II level. The districts (oblasti) are territorial units at 
NUTS III level where state authority is deconcentrated but no directly elected bodies exist. 
District Governors are appointed by the Council of Ministers and their work is co-ordinated 
by the Ministry for Regional Development and Public Works. The district administrations 
staffed with civil servants are entirely dependant on financial transfers from the state budget 
as they, in contrast to the municipalities, have no property or own sources of revenue. 
Municipalities, although authorised to rise local taxes also depend significantly on grants from 
the central budget. Since the 28 districts were too small to be compatible with the objectives 
of EU regional policy and structural funding, six planning regions (rayoni za planirane) were 
introduced at NUTS II level. They represented amalgamated entities for the purposes of 
planning and programming of regional development policy (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1. Macro-regions, their administrative centres and constituent districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Regional Development Act 2004 
 
In 2000 inter-ministerial Commissions for Economic and Social Cohesion were established at 
the macro-regional level with consultative functions. They also included representatives of 
local administrations and economic and social partners and were intended to provide input in 
the process of preparation of programming documents for regional development. The 
European Commission strongly criticised the weakness of the inter-ministerial Commissions 
Planning macro-regions in Bulgaria (NUTS II): 
 
1. North-Western (Severozapaden) with centre Vidin, covering the oblasti of Vidin, Vratsa and Montana 
2. Norh-Central (Severen tsentralen) with centre Russe, includes the oblasti of Russe, Veliko Tarnovo, 
Gabrovo, Pleven and Lovech 
3. North-Eastern (Severoiztochen) with centre Varna, comprising the oblasti of Varna, Targovishte, 
Shumen, Razgrad, Silistra and Dobrich 
4. South-Eastern (Yugoiztochen) with centre Bourgas, covering the oblasti of Bourgas, Sliven and Yambol 
5. South-Central (Yuzhen tsentralen) with centre Plovdiv, including the oblasti of Pluvdiv, Kurdzali, 
Haskovo, Pazardzik, Smolyan and Stara Zagora 
6. South-Western (Yugozapaden) with centre Sofia, covering the city of Sofia and the oblasti of Sofia, 
Kyustendil, Blagoevgrad and Pernik.   14
as partnership structures (Commission 2002: 101) and even qualified them as ‘dormant’ 
(Commission 2003: 92). The revised Regional Development Act of 2004 replaced the 
Commissions for Economic and Social Cohesion with Regional Development Councils 
(RDC) with decision-making functions in the process of planning and programming. It should 
be emphasised here that the RDCs were simply a newly institutionalised meeting venue for 
already existing sub-national entities (districts and municipalities) and central ministries 
(senior civil servants or deputy-ministers for Regional Development, Finance, Environment, 
Agriculture, Economy, Labour, Transport). But it was only the representatives of 
municipalities (one per participating district) that were directly elected officials. Furthermore, 
the only permanent structures at the NUTS II level were the small technical support units 
located in the administration of the macro-regional centre that drafted the planning and 
programming documents and provided expertise to applicants or final beneficiaries of 
funding.  
 
The six macro-regions and the RDCs were established in order to help with the planning and 
programming for regional development and EU funding. The RDCs approved the draft 
Regional Development Plan of the respective macro-region and agreed the measures to be 
included in the National Operational Programme for Regional Development. They also 
ensured the coherence of the Development Plans drafted by the districts. The 2005 
Monitoring Report by the Commission endorsed these administrative-territorial arrangements 
and stated that ‘Bulgaria is meeting its commitments and requirements arising from the 
accession negotiations in relation to territorial organisation’ (Commission 2005: 58). 
Consequently, preparations for EU accession have not resulted in a process of regionalisation 
in Bulgaria. At the early stages of conception of administrative-territorial reforms there were 
some indications that self-government may be introduced at district (NUTS 3) level but this 
was never implemented (Commission 1997: 92; Djildjov 2002: 79).  
 
The issue of introducing an intermediate level of self-government never stood high on the 
political agenda. The Saxe-Cobourg Government promised at the start of its mandate to 
encourage a discussion on the future of local self-government and the possibility of 
establishing an intermediate tier of self-government ‘corresponding to the requirements for 
Bulgaria’s EU integration’ (CMRB 2001: 117). However, this opportunity was not pursued. 
The only political party that explicitly declared support for an elected second tier of self-
government was the Turkish minority party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF 2005).   15
The MRF floated the idea of granting self-government to the district of Kurdzali (bordering 
Turkey) where elections for local authorities and National Parliament were traditionally won 
by the MRF. But the MRF did not get much practical or rhetorical support from other parties, 
including from its coalition partners in government. At a 2003 meeting with the EU 
Committee of the Regions an MRF representative promoted the introduction of self-
government at the intermediate level (Dnevnik.bg, 17/9/03). This arguably represented an 
attempt to use the EU as an additional resource in domestic politics but it did not bear fruit 
largely because other domestic actors did not support it. There was never an outright 
opposition to MRF aspirations by other political parties either. It is possible that debates took 
place in closed political circles but were never made public because they would have been 
detrimental to Bulgaria’s minority rights record. Thus the EU accession criteria on minority 
rights protection precluded domestic debates but, contrary to expectations, not in favour of 
regionalisation. 
 
Spiridonova and Grigorov (2000) have argued that the adoption of the 1999 Regional 
Development Act stirred considerable interest in Bulgaria. However, a substantial political 
debate on administrative-territorial division first took place between February 2003 and 
March 2004, when the new Regional Development Act was considered by Parliament. 
National MPs were lobbied by a number of interests, district governors and mayors. Some 
district governors expressed hopes that the 2004 Regional Development Act would introduce 
directly elected bodies at NUTS III level to increase legitimacy and to allow for own financial 
resources. Own sources of income meant more opportunities for applying for and co-
financing regional development projects. Parliamentary discussions on the draft Law, 
however, focused on matters substantially different from regionalisation. The most 
contentious issues proved to be the centres of which districts should become the 
administrative centres of the new macro-regions and how areas for targeted support should be 
determined. The administrative centres of macro-regions might become important gatekeepers 
because they host the technical support units for co-ordinating, planning and programming of 
regional assistance. The areas for targeted support were designated the main beneficiaries of 
regional development funding for specific handicaps. On these two issues MPs from the same 
constituency teamed together regardless of party membership to achieve a better deal for their 
people. This might be seen as the emergence of a sort of common regional economic identity 
or might well be just populist politics. The debates on the 2004 Regional Development Act 
thus focused on determining the ‘pragmatic’ criteria for distributing EU and national money   16
for regional development and not on ‘paradigmatic’ debates about redefining constitutional 
powers amongst levels of governance. With regard to Europeanisation, the EU clearly 
changed the domestic opportunity structure but this was not enough to produce change. What 
mattered were domestic actors as utility maximisers and the resources they had, or were 
willing to invest to effect change. 
 
4. Regional Policy in Bulgaria 
The 1991 democratic Constitution referred to the responsibility of the state to ensure the 
balanced development of each of the country’s regions by means of its financial, credit and 
investment policy. Until 1998 regional development was the outcome of sectoral plans and 
decisions by individual ministries on the location of investment, production and settlements 
(Stoyanov 2003: 59-60; Spiridonova and Grigorov 2000: 81). The 1994 National Directives 
for Regional Development specified that structural adjustment policies developed on a 
sectoral basis could include considerations of regional problems. In its 1997 Opinion on 
Bulgaria the Commission observed at the national level a realisation that regional policy was 
separate from, although interlinked with, sectoral measures and that sub-national levels of 
government could help address the rising regional disparities. At the same time, the domestic 
capacity to translate this vision into  a coherent set of policy strategies and budgetary 
instruments for a regional development policy remained weak. The first legislative framework 
- a Regional Development Act (RDA) - was adopted as late as 1999, prior to the opening of 
accession negotiations between Bulgaria and the EU and coincided with the launch of a new 
approach to pre-accession funding. This was a first attempt to establish a regional policy. 
Considering the absence of national traditions and expertise in regional policy it should come 
without a surprise that Bulgaria’s draft legislation was ‘based on EC practices’ (Commission 
1997: 93). A National Plan for Regional Development for the period 2000-6 was drafted as 
the main instrument for formulating a coherent policy and forecasting financial resources. It 
stated that regional policy 
 
is undoubtedly necessary and justified by the fact that regional disparities give rise to social, political 
and economic problems, the fact that the national economy is strongly dependent on its regional 
components and the fact that market forces cannot by themselves ensure balanced regional 
development. On the other hand, it [the National Plan for Regional Development] is a response to the 
requirements in the area of regional policy and economic and social cohesion stemming from 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, and the opportunities for utilising EU pre-accession assistance (CMRB 
1999: 1, emphasis added, translation mine). 
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Thus EU accession preparations were put on a par with domestic concerns about regional 
disparities. A further pragmatic reason for adopting the 1999 RDA was to provide a 
legislative framework for the conduct of EU funded cross-border co-operation initiatives and 
to allow the formation of Euroregions as institutional structures. In its 1999 Regular Report 
the Commission (1999: 46) noted that the RDA ‘aims at establishing prerequisites for 
sustainable and balanced development of the different regions, reducing disparities in 
employment and income, carrying out regional and cross-border co-operation and European 
integration’. However, the main pre-accession efforts focused on strengthening programming 
and co-ordinating capacities at the central level, for example by creating a Regional 
Development Directorate within the Council of Ministers administration in late 1999, and 
restructuring the Ministry of Regional Development to meet its responsibilities under the pre-
accession funds.  
 
The 1999 RDA and the National Plan for Regional Development 2000-6 represented a first 
stage in interpreting and translating the EU regional policy requirements. The second stage of 
updating the domestic arrangements was launched in 2004, with the adoption of a new 
Regional Development Act. This happened somewhat at the eleventh hour, when legislation 
had to be drafted if negotiations were to be closed and EU funds channelled. Bulgarian 
authorities approached the Commission (DG Enlargement and Regional Policy) for advice 
while drafting the 2004 RDA and the accompanying strategies. Some of the Commission 
recommendations were not accepted but a Commission official argued that this was ‘not 
dramatic’ since the EU only required the adoption of framework legislation and it was 
Bulgaria that knew best what would work on the ground. The explanatory note accompanying 
the proposal for a new RDA explicitly linked it to the requirements of Chapter 21 and to 
Commission evaluations. In particular, the 1999 criteria for designating areas for targeted 
support to reduce intra-regional disparities were not accepted by the Commission and had to 
be redefined (Stoyanov 2003: 65). The Commission’s Third Report on Economic and Social 
Cohesion was also influential because its new priorities for regional development were 
incorporated in the long-term National Strategy for Regional Development 2005-15 (NSRD) 
(Commission 2004). The NSRD stated that the principles and aims of the EU’s regional 
policy were reflected in the vision, aims and priorities of Bulgaria’s regional development 
policy. It referred in particular to the principles of structural funds implementation 
(programming, partnership, additionality and concentration) and the EU’s Lisbon and 
Gothenburg Strategies (CMRB 2005).   18
 
This suggests that regional development was no longer seen as a central government 
prerogative. Yet despite this change in policy rhetoric the central government remained the 
gatekeeper. District authorities had week administrative capacities to implement EU funding. 
This was to some extent caused by the shift in Commission preferences towards more 
centralised management of EU funds and the fact that during accession preparations its main 
interlocutor was the national government. Furthermore, the severe economic crisis that struck 
Bulgaria in 1996-7 had unfavourable implications for financial decentralisation; sub-national 
authorities remained dependent on state grants. Because of the principle of additionality 
district and municipal authorities were extremely limited in applying for EU pre-accession 
funding. It was also difficult for them to pay membership fees in trans-national networks and 
attend meetings of regional authorities from across the EU. In the period 2001-5 just two 
districts, Rousse and Haskovo, were members of the Assembly of the European Regions 
(AER). In 2004 only Sofia had a bureau de representation in Brussels located in an 
inexpensive building and staffed by one person. Several other cities considered opening 
representations but no such plans were made at the macro-regional level. Local authorities 
also had their own channel for international co-operation - the National Association of 
Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria had concluded a number of bilateral agreements 
with partner associations and was a member of the Council of European Municipalities and 
Regions (CEMR) (Nikolova 2006a).  
 
Regionalisation in the years of pre-accession was essentially an elite-driven, top-down 
process. There was hardly any bottom-up ‘push’ for regionalisation for several reasons. First, 
Bulgaria had strong traditions of centralism. Second, following the two world wars Bulgarian 
territories were annexed to neighbouring states and people in historical regions parts of which 
were lost were keen to reassert their Bulgarian, rather than their regional identity. Bulgarians 
remained extremely sensitive to any developments that can result in further loss of territory 
i.e. self-government claims by the Turkish minority. Finally, new regional identities take long 
to develop. At the level of the planning macro-regions there were no significant economic 
disparities that could facilitate this process of identity formation. With the exception of the 
South-Western macro-region (including the capital Sofia), where the GDP per head was 40 
per cent of the EU25 average, the remaining five macro-regions were at approximately the 
same level of development – around 25 per cent of the EU25 average (CMRB, 2005). 
Substantial disparities, however, were established at the municipal level (Spiridonova and   19
Grigorov 2000). For that reason the Regional Development Act provided for the definition of 
areas for targeted support within the planning macro-regions comprising one or more 
municipalities. Funding had to flow to areas for economic growth or in industrial decay, to 
backward border, rural and mountainous regions. The areas for targeted support were decided 
by the RDCs on the basis of criteria adopted by the Council of Ministers in mid-July 2004. 
These included socio-economic and demographic trends, geographic position and 
infrastructure endowment. When a municipality no longer satisfied the relevant criteria it had 
to be excluded from the area for targeted support and from substantial amounts of funding. In 
that sense the Regional Development Act created prerequisites for ‘negative competition’ 
because municipalities had to contend to be laggards to become eligible for targeted funding. 
Since District Governors participated in the RDCs they were also likely to compete at the 
macro-regional level to fit municipalities from their district into as many areas for targeted 
support as possible in order to receive maximum funding. Within the timeframe adopted by 
this article (1991-2005) definition of areas for targeted support was still ongoing. However, a 
sub-national official expressed concerns about inconsistency of priorities within the planning 
region because actors were hostile to each other. On one hand there was the competition for 
limited resources, on the other there was the perception of a ‘democratic deficit’, since 
District Governors were not directly elected by the people but had the responsibility by law to 
exercise control over municipalities.  
 
The pre-accession period was intended to provide actors at different levels of government 
with a framework for learning how to define together what was best for everyone, to help 
change culture and mentalities and introduce a more inclusive mode of governance. In other 
words identity needs to emerge in each planning region by articulating common economic 
interests rather than by fostering aid-dependency and contests for funding. This process is one 
of evolution, rather than revolution and will continue for some time after Bulgaria’s 
accession. In the short term, however, the emergence of such identity in administrative 
regions was not evident and antiquated political and administrative cultures lingered on in the 
state institutions especially below the national level. If such underlying patterns are not 
adapted it will be hard to use effectively EU regional funding simply because the needs of the 
regions will not be known or recognised. In one Bulgarian municipality where buildings of 
local and district administrations happened to sit at the opposite sides of a square officials 
referred to their partners as ‘the people on the other side’ and it was exactly this mentality that   20
needed to change if partnership was to acquire substance and help address territorial 
disparities. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The EU has had only a limited impact on administrative-territorial reform in Bulgaria. An 
opportunity existed for EU requirements to be interpreted as an obligation for establishing a 
second tier of self-government but this did not coincide with the interests of powerful 
domestic actors. Instead, national political elites opted for a purely pragmatic way of 
accommodating EU requirements by introducing six NUTS II planning macro-regions but not 
granting self-government either to these new entities or to the already existing districts. Only 
District Governors and the Turkish minority party MRF supported an intermediate level of 
self-government but they could not draw on formal institutional resources or economic 
disparities among macro-regions to push such major reform through. In contrast, the role of 
the EU was substantial in the formulation of a regional policy in Bulgaria. The EU regional 
policy served as a benchmark for designing approaches and instruments and defining 
priorities for regional development. Prior to the opening of accession negotiations, regional 
measures formed part of sectoral policies. The first RDA was adopted in 1999 but it was only 
in 2004, in view of closing negotiations on Chapter 21, that more detailed and systematic 
legislation for planning and programming of regional development was drafted and rendered 
operational. A sceptic may argue here that macro-regions were required for the planning and 
programming of a national policy for regional development, rather than for EU funding. But it 
should be emphasised that prior to the opening of membership talks a coherent regional policy 
did not exist in Bulgaria and when it was introduced it was largely inspired by EU 
requirements and principles of funding implementation. Furthermore, post-communist 
concerns for modernisation of the state administration were largely satisfied as early as 1991 
with the introduction of local self-government and, to a lesser extent, with the reinstatement 
of the 28 districts. There were no other stimuli for Bulgaria to reform further its 
administrative-territorial division except EU accession and funding. Even if EU requirements 
were not the main cause for change, they certainly modified the incentive structure in the 
direction of introducing macro-regions.  
 
Although formal structures and rules changed and ideas of participatory governance were 
incorporated into the national policy for regional development, traditions and understanding   21
on the ground remained antiquated. Actors originating from different levels found it difficult 
to co-operate and this was exacerbated by the need to compete for EU funding within macro-
regions. In the short term Europeanisation resulted only in isolated change. It remains to be 
seen whether in the long run the two parallel systems, the formal and informal one, will 
consolidate or whether underlying administrative and political traditions will transform and 
open the way for a common, albeit economic regional identity and optimal use of EU funding. 
The long-term impact of the EU influence will only be observable several years after Bulgaria 
joins. But the accession will reshape the conditions under which the process of 
Europeanisation takes place in at least two ways: firstly, by offering Bulgaria the possibility to 
upload its national preferences and secondly, by gradually dissolving the enlargement power 
asymmetry and depriving the EU of its conditionality leverage. In fact, it is possible that upon 
membership domestic reforms get reversed, providing a real evidence of the influence EU 
conditionality had been able to exert prior to accession. Europeanisation in the long run may 
not be a simple continuation of the processes taking place during the years of pre-accession 
and this poses a challenge to our conceptual tools. 
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